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DEFENDANT AMENABLE TO PROCESS
Defendant filed a petition to prevent the transfer of an action brought
in the Federal Court in the Western District of New York to the Southern
District of California under Section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code' as amend-
ed, which provides that "for the convenience of the parties and in the interest
of justice, a district court may transfer any action to another district
where it might have been brought." The district court granted plaintiff's
motion to have this cause transferred to the Southern District of California. 2
Held, that since the meaning of the word "brought" in Section 1404(a) is
not synonymous with "commenced" in Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and defendants were not amenable to process in California, the action
could not be transferred to the federal district court in California. Foster-
Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950).
The problem presented in the instant case concerns the judicial inter-
pretation of Section 1404(a), whereby any civil action may be transferred to
any district in which it might have been brought, in the furtherance of
justice and the convenience of the parties. This section, in effect, codifies the
common law rule of forum non conveniens, a doctrine which was given
judicial cognizance prior to the enactment of Section 1404(a).4 The question
of federal courts applying the doctrine was not settled until 1947.2 The com-
mon law theory is applied only if venue is properly established and the
plaintiff has at least two forums from which to choose.' However, under
the proper circumstances,8 and in compliance with the new provisions of
the venue statute,9 it is discretionary with the court 10 whether or not it will
transfer an action to another district rather than to dismiss it as had been
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1946).
2. McCarley v. Foster-Milburn, 89 F. Supp. 643 (W.D.N.Y. 1950).
3. Richer v. Chicago R.I. & P. R.R., 80 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Mo. 1948)
4. Under the doctrine of forum non convenicns a court may refuse jurisdiction in
certain cases where to assume it might cause great hardship and inconvenience even
though authorized according to the rules of procedure; see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947); Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945); Wilson v. Seas
Shipping Co., 78 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1948); O'Connor v. Yardley Golf Club, 79
F. Supp. 264, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
5. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 4.
6. Tivoli Realty v. Interstate Circuit, 167 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948); Neal v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 77 F. Supp. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
7. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, supra note 4; Tivoli Realty v. Interstate Circuit,
supra note 6.
8. E.g., Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); United States v. E. I. Du Pont De
Nemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D. D.C. 1949) (the practical problems confronting
each court); Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Magnetic Separator Co., 86 F.
Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1949) (economic conditions involved in each particular case);
Chaffin v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 80 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) (the distances
parties and witnesses must travel); Hayes v. Chicago R.I. & P. R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821
(D. Minn. 1948) (the accessibility to sources of proof).
9. Nagle v. Pennsylvania R.R., 89 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
10. Christopher v. American News Co., 176 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1949).
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customary in the past, 1' thereby subjecting the parties to great expense
and hardship.
Rule 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that a civil action is
commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Thus, if the word
"brought" as used in Section 1404(a) should be considered as being synony-
mous with the word "commenced," as used in Rule 3, then the action in the
instant case could have been transferred. But the words "begun," "coin-
nlenced" and "instituted," as used in relation to commencement of an
action, designate the earliest point of litigation. Therefore, the mere filing
of a bill of complaint, payment of the prerequisite fees and lodging of
service in the hands of a sheriff would signify that an action has been
commenced. This precludes any synonymy between "brought" and "com-
menced," for, historically, the jurisdiction of a court is limited to the con-
fines of its borders, 12 and notice sent outside the state or personal service
based on a possible amenability is unavailing as against a non-resident de-
fendant in an action to recover a personal judgment.' 8 A fortiori, although
an action may be "commenced" in every state in the union, as a practical
matter it can only be "brought" where the defendant is amenable to
process.
This is the first case to give any definite legal definition to the word
"brought" within the purview of Section 1404(a). Judge Learned Hand, in
rendering his decision, gave vitality to the object sought to be accomplished
by the statute and his interpretation thereof creates no conflict in the
federal courts on this point. The purpose of the statute is to provide for
transferral of actions from one district to another where the scales of
justice might be more evenly balanced, and not to permit transferral at
the mere whim and caprice of the plaintiff, as was attempted in the instant
case. The Judicial Code was revised in 1948 and, as is clearly seen by the
reviser's notes,14 the legislative intent is to cure the evil of abuse of venue
privileges. For the court to have ruled otherwise would have infected the
laws of procedure with a languishing disease which had its inception in the
decision of the lower court.
This particular innovation in the field of federal venue legislation may
well be regarded as a milestone and heralded as another simplification in
the method of realistically achieving justice. Prior to this enactment the
choice of forum lay generally with the plaintiff. Under the new code,
whenever justice can be served better, the inequities previously imposed
upon a defendant are placed upon the scale of justice with "judicial dis-
cretion" as a pivot point, and where the balance is definitely one-sided the
cause will be transferred to a district "where it might have been brought
originally."
11. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v, Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
12. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
13. McDonald v, Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917).
14. 28 U.SC. § 1404(a) (1946).
